Abstract. Sanitizable signatures allow designated parties (the sanitizers) to apply arbitrary modifications to some restricted parts of signed messages. A secure scheme should not only be unforgeable, but also protect privacy and hold both the signer and the sanitizer accountable. Two important security properties that are seemingly difficult to achieve simultaneously and efficiently are invisibility and unlinkability. While invisibility ensures that the admissible modifications are hidden from external parties, unlinkability says that sanitized signatures cannot be linked to their sources. Achieving both properties simultaneously is crucial for applications where sensitive personal data is signed with respect to data-dependent admissible modifications. The existence of an efficient construction achieving both properties was recently posed as an open question by Camenisch et al. (PKC'17). In this work, we propose a solution to this problem with a two-step construction. First, we construct (non-accountable) invisible and unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures on equivalence classes and other basic primitives. Second, we put forth a generic transformation using verifiable ring signatures to turn any non-accountable sanitizable signature into an accountable one while preserving all other properties. When instantiating in the generic group and random oracle model, the efficiency of our construction is comparable to that of prior constructions, while providing stronger security guarantees.
Accountability. The signer cannot accuse the sanitizer (vice versa) of signing. Transparency. Non-sanitized and sanitized signatures are indistinguishable. Invisibility. The class of admissible modifications are hidden from external parties. Unlinkability. Sanitized signatures cannot be linked to their sources.
Applications. Ateniese et al. [2] suggested a wide range of applications of sanitizable signatures, including multicast transmission, database outsourcing, protecting health information, and secure routing. As an example, we highlight the importance of invisibility and unlinkability of sanitizable signatures for signing medical records. Suppose that a physician signs medical records of patients using a sanitizable signature scheme. The patients can then sanitize the medical record for different purposes. For example, they may 1) remove the personal information and delegate the anonymized record for analysis; 2) remove everything except for the personal information for financing purposes, in such a way that the receivers are convinced of the authenticity of the record. As discussed in [7] , unlinkability ensures that colluding receivers cannot reconstruct the full medical records since they cannot link records sanitized from the same source.
However, suppose that the admissible modifications chosen by the physician, are data-dependent. For instance, patients suffering from certain sensitive medical condition that might possibly lead them to be discriminated against, may be allowed to change the fields corresponding to these conditions to NO, while other patients not suffering from any of these conditions are not allowed to change any of the fields to YES. Such a policy of assigning admissible modifications prevents the former patients from facing discrimination when revealing such conditions is not necessary, while preventing the latter patients from getting hold of drugs which are otherwise only issued to patients suffering from those conditions. The security property invisibility is crucial for such a scenario, since the receiver of a sanitized medical record can otherwise easily tell whether the corresponding patient suffers from a sensitive condition by just checking whether changing the corresponding field in the record is modifiable or not.
Open Problem
As discussed above, achieving both unlinkability and invisibility is desirable for certain applications. Obviously, realizing both notions simultaneously is rather easy from a theoretical point of view using common "encrypt and prove" techniques. Although the feasibility is clear, doing so efficiently turns out to be challenging.
One obvious starting point to answer this question is the idea to lift an existing invisible sanitizable signature scheme to an unlinkable one. Following this path does not seem to be fruitful, because existing invisible constructions adopt the "chameleonhash-then-sign" paradigm: The main ingredients in this approach are a signature scheme for which the signer has the secret key, and a chameleon hashing scheme 4 for which the sanitizer has the trapdoor. To sign a message, the signer first splits the message into message blocks, some of which are "admissible", meaning that they are allowed to be changed by the sanitizer, while some are not. The signer then computes the chameleon hashes of the individual message blocks, in such a way that the sanitizer can recover the trapdoors corresponding to the admissible blocks, and sign the hash values. Later, the sanitizer can change the admissible blocks by using the trapdoors to "explain" the hash values with new messages.
Under the "chameleon-hash-then-sign" paradigm, we can see that signatures are inherently linkable. This is because all signatures which are sanitized from a fresh signature contain the same set of hash values. One can of course hide the hash values by using generic non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments, but that would not yield a practical scheme. Therefore, [10] and [3] posed the following open problem:
"How to construct (efficient) sanitizable signature schemes which are simultaneously unlinkable and invisible?"
In this work, we answer this question by constructing the first efficient invisible and unlinkable sanitizable signature scheme.
Our Techniques
To solve the problem of constructing an efficient unlinkable and invisible sanitizable signature scheme, we suggest a modular approach visualized with the help of First, we decouple the problem by presenting a generic transformation that turns any non-accountable sanitizable signature into an accountable one while preserving or upgrading all other properties. Our transformation is very efficient as it only requires a verifiable [31] ring signature 5 . Recall that a ring signature scheme allows a signer to sign messages on behalf of an ad-hoc group picked during signature generation. Verifiability in this context means that a signer can (dis)prove the authorship of a given signature a posteriori. The basic idea of our transformation is as follows.
To sign (resp. sanitize), the signer (resp. the sanitizer) runs the sign (resp. sanitize) algorithm of the weak sanitizable signature scheme, and signs the whole output (ignoring the underlying structure) with a verifiable ring signature scheme, where the ring is composed by the verification keys of the signer and the sanitizer. The resulting scheme is accountable because the signer can (dis)prove the authorship of a certain signature using the accountability property of the ring signature itself. Our transformation does not only preserve the underlying properties of the (non-accountable) sanitizable signature scheme, but it also strengthens some of them: If the underling scheme is weakly immutable (resp. weakly unlinkable), then the resulting scheme is immutable (resp. unlinkable).
Next, we tackle the main problem of constructing an invisible and unlinkable (nonaccountable) sanitizable signature scheme. The (long-term) public and secret keys of the signer are the verification and signing keys of a certain signature scheme, which we refer to as the outer-layer scheme. To sign a message, the signer splits the message into message blocks, and generates pairs of signing and verification keys of an inner-layer signature scheme. Naturally, the signer signs each message block with the corresponding inner signing key, and signs the verification keys with its (long-term) outer secret key. To allow sanitization, the signer additionally delegates the inner signing keys corresponding to the admissible blocks by encrypting them under the sanitizer public key. Note that all message blocks are treated equally, which is critical for invisibility, except for the generation of the ciphertext. By the semantic security of the encryption scheme, the signature is still invisible to the eyes of an external observer.
To generate signatures for sanitized messages, the sanitizer simply uses the delegated inner signing keys to sign the modified message blocks. However, the resulting sanitized signature is now linkable since the outer signature on the inner verification keys and the keys themselves remain unchanged. To resolve this issue, we need to craft an inner signature scheme with some special properties. Our inner signatures scheme is very similar to the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature scheme [4] and works as follows: The public key consists of two group elements (G x 1 , G xy 1 ) and the secret key y ∈ Z q can be used to sign a message m by computing σ := H(m) y ∈ G 2 . The verification is done using the pairing e (G x 1 , σ) = e (G xy 1 , H(m)) . The difference with respect to BLS lies in the extra term of the public key whose role will appear clear in a moment. The property that we need is that the keys and the signatures are publicly re-randomizable, i.e., one can compute consistent scalings of both the signature and the public key
It is easy to see that the resulting key-signature pair is still consistent, i.e., the verification checks out. Unfortunately, it turns out that the re-randomization strategy of above is too simplistic and it is prone to mix-and-match attacks. We therefore devise a slightly more sophisticated re-randomization procedure
which scales the two elements of the public keys by two different scalars r and rs respectively. Fortunately, this does not affect the correctness of the scheme. The last obstacle towards decorrelating signed and sanitized signatures is a mechanism to publicly rerandomize the outer signature so that it is consistent with the rerandomized inner verification keys. More concretely, the problem is to rerandomize signatures of (G Exp. ) respectively. It turns out that equivalence class signatures (EQS) provide exactly such functionality.
Our Results
To summarize, in this paper we present the following results:
-We present the first efficient sanitizable signature scheme which simultaneously achieves unlinkability and invisibility. This resolves an open problem posed by Camenisch et al. [10] . Our construction is over type-III pairing groups. It uses an equivalence class signature (EQS) scheme, a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme, a hash function (modeled as a random oracle) with images living in G 2 , and a verifiable ring signature (VRS) scheme. We suggest to instantiate our construction with the EQS scheme of Fuchsbauer, Hanser, and Slamanig [20] , the PKE scheme obtained by applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [21] to the ElGamal encryption scheme [?] , and the VRS scheme of Bultel and Lafourcade [9] . The efficiency of such an instantiation is summarized in Table 1 and 2. -We construct a weak sanitizable signatures from equivalence class signatures and other basic primitives. The scheme is weak in the sense that it satisfies weak immutability, weak unlinkability, strong proof-restricted transparency 6 , and strong invisibility, but not accountability.
-We present a generic transformation from weak sanitizable signatures to fullyfledged sanitizable signatures, using VRS. Fully-fledged sanitizable signatures satisfy immutability, unlinkability, strong proof-restricted transparency, strong invisibility, and strong accountability. The transformation is very efficient as it ignores the structure of the underlying weak sanitizable signature scheme. This allows the future design of sanitizable signatures to focus on achieving other properties while not worrying about accountability.
Related work
An alternative definition of accountability called non-interactive public accountability was given by Brzuska et al. [8] . This variant of accountability is mutually exclusive with transparency. Several existing works [7, 17, 29, 9] proposed schemes that are both transparent and unlinkable. Recently, Krenn et al. [28] propose the "strong" versions of unforgeability, (non-interactive public) accountability, and transparency. The notion of invisibility dates back to the original work by Ateniese et al. [2] , and was formalized by Camenisch et al. [10] . Beck et al. [3] refined the notion to strong invisibility and proposed a scheme that is both strongly invisible and strongly accountable. Recently Fischlin et al. [16] shows that an invisible (but not unlinkable nor transparent) sanitizable signature scheme can be obtained from any public key encryption scheme.
Miyazaki et al. [32] also considered "invisible sanitizable signatures" which is actually a different primitive known as redactable signatures [15] as discussed in [10] . Extensions of sanitizable signatures such as the multi-sanitizer setting [12] and a setting where the modification capabilities of the sanitizer are limited [11] were considered. Other primitives related to sanitizable signatures include homomorphic signatures [27, 26] , redactable signatures [15, 35, 5] , and proxy signatures [37, 36, 34] .
Preliminaries
Throughout this work we denote by λ ∈ N the security parameter and by poly(λ) any function that is bounded by a polynomial in λ. We denote any function that is negligible in the security parameter by negl(λ). We say that an algorithm is PPT if it is modelled as a probabilistic Turing machine whose running time is bounded by some function poly(λ). Given a set S, we denote by x ← S the sampling of and element uniformly at random from S, and we denote by x ← A(in) the output of the algorithm A on input in. The elements of the set {1, . . . , n} are succinctly represented as [n]. Next we define the necessary notions for understanding our constructions.
Class-Hiding Groups
be the description of a multiplicative bilinear group of prime order q generated by some efficient PPT algorithm BGGen(1 λ ). LetX = (X 1 , . . . , X ) ∈ G 1 and ρ ∈ Z q . We writeX :
We then define the equivalence relation
For a vectorM ∈ G 1 for some > 1, its equivalence class is defined by
Next we define the notion of class hiding for a relation R, which intuitively says that it should be hard to distinguish elements from the same equivalence class from randomly sampled group elements 7 .
Definition 1 (Class-Hiding). A relation R is said to be class-hiding if for all > 1 and for all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
The following lemma was proven (in different wordings) by Hanser and Slamanig [24] :
Lemma 1 ( [24] ). R is class-hiding if and only if the DDH assumption holds in G 1 .
Equivalence Class Signatures
Equivalence class signatures allow users to sign representatives of the equivalence classes defined above, such that a representative and its corresponding signature can be adapted to give a fresh signature of a random representative in the same class. Below, we recall the formal definition of equivalence class signatures [24] .
Definition 2 (EQS).
An equivalence class signature (EQS) scheme is defined with respect to a bilinear group description BG and a message length > 1. An EQS scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms (KGen, Sign, ChgRep, Vf, VfKey) defined as follows: (pk, sk) ← KGen(BG, 1 ): The key generation algorithm inputs a group BG and the message length 1 . It outputs a key pair (pk, sk).
The signing algorithm inputs the secret key sk and a messageM ∈ We refer the reader to [24] for a formal treatment of correctness. We define existential unforgeability under random message attacks (EUF-CMA) in the following.
Definition 3 (EUF-CMA
). An EQS scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) if for all > 1, for all n ∈ poly(λ), and for all PPT adversaries A,
Next we recall the notion of signature adaptation which captures the fact that signatures output by ChgRep are distributed like fresh signatures on the new representative.
Definition 4 (Perfect Signature Adaptation). An EQS scheme is said to perfectly adapt signatures if for all tuples (sk, pk,M , σ, ρ) such that VfKey(pk, sk) = 1, Vf(pk,M , σ) = 1,M ∈ G 1 for some > 1, and ρ ← Z * q it holds that ChgRep(pk,M , σ, ρ) and Sign(sk,M ρ )
are identically distributed.
Verifiable Ring Signatures
Ring Signatures allow users to sign a message anonymously within a group of users, where the group is chosen upon signature creation in an ad-hoc way. Verifiable Ring Signatures (VRS) allow each user of the group to prove a posteriori whether he is the signer of a given message or not. VRS was formally defined and constructed in [31] . Below, we recall the syntax of VRS.
Definition 5 (Verifiable Ring Signature (VRS)). A Verifiable Ring Signature (VRS) scheme is a tuple of six algorithms VRS = (Setup, KGen, Sign, Verify, Prove, Judge) defined as follows:
On input the security parameter 1 λ , return the public parameters pp.
(pk, sk) ← KGen(pp): On input the public parameters pp, return a pair of signer public/private keys (pk, sk). On input a ring L, a message m, a signature σ, a public key pk, and a proof π, return a bit b or the distinguished symbol ⊥. By convention, if b = 1 (resp. 0) then π proves that σ was (resp. was not) generated by the signer corresponding to the public key pk.
A VRS is required to be (strongly) unforgeable, (strongly) accountable, anonymous, and (strongly) non-seizable. For their formal definitions we refer to Appendix A.2.
Definition of Sanitizable Signatures
In the following we recall the syntax of sanitizable signatures. Let the signer and the sanitizer be denoted by S and Z respectively. Throughout this work we consider messages m = (m 1 , . . . , m ) to be tuples of parts for some > 1, where m k ∈ {0, 1} * for all k ∈ , and represent the admissible modification as a bit string α = α 1 . . . α ∈ {0, 1} . We write α k = 1 if and only if the k-th block is admissible. For ease of exposition, we sometimes write k ∈ α instead of α k = 1. Let δ be a function which maps a message m to another message m = δ(m). Also, we say that δ is an admissible modification, denoted by α(δ) = 1, if and only if for all messages m and m = δ(m), it holds that m k = m k for all k ∈ α.
Definition 6 (Sanitizable Signature Scheme). A sanitizable signature scheme consists of the PPT algorithms (Setup, KGen S , KGen Z , Sign, San, Verify, Prove, Judge). pp ← Setup(1 λ , 1 ): The setup algorithm inputs the security parameter 1 λ and the (maximum) length 1 of the messages and creates a public parameter pp.
The signer key generation algorithm inputs the public parameter pp and outputs (pk S , sk S ), the public and secret key of the signer respectively.
The sanitizer key generation algorithm inputs the public parameter pp and outputs (pk Z , sk Z ), the public and secret key of the sanitizer respectively.
The signing algorithm inputs a message m ∈ ({0, 1} * ) , a signer private key sk S , a sanitizer public key pk Z , as well as a description α of the admissible modifications to m by the sanitizer and outputs a signature σ.
The sanitizing algorithm takes as input a message m ∈ ({0, 1} * ) , a description δ of the desired modifications to m, a signature σ, the signer public key pk S , and a sanitizer private key sk Z . It outputs a new signature σ .
The verification algorithm inputs a message m, a signature σ, a signer public key pk S , as well as a sanitizer public key pk Z and outputs a bit b. π ← Prove(sk S , pk Z , m, σ): The proof algorithm takes as input a signer private key sk S , a message m, a signature σ, and a sanitizer public key pk Z and outputs a proof π.
The judge algorithm inputs a message m, a signature σ, signer and sanitizer public keys pk S , pk Z , and proof π. It outputs a decision d ∈ {S, Z} indicating whether the message-signature pair was created by the signer or the sanitizer.
For a sanitizable signature scheme the usual correctness properties should hold, saying that genuinely signed or sanitized messages are accepted and that a genuinely created proof by the signer leads the judge to decide in favor of the signer. For a formal approach to correctness see [6] .
Unlinkability and Invisibility
In the original definition of unlinkability by Brzuska et al. [7] , the property was modeled using an experiment where the adversary gets access to, among other oracles, a "leftor-right sanitize" oracle LoRSanitO, which inputs two message-modification-signature tuples and outputs a sanitized signature produced from one of the tuples. The adversary's task is to decide which tuple is used for the sanitization.
To define LoRSanitO, Brzuska et al. assumed that the description of admissible modifications α can be recovered from a valid signature, so that LoRSanitO can recover the admissible modifications from both input signatures and check whether they are equal. Note that if this check is omitted, then the adversary can trivially decide which signature is used by querying the sanitize oracle SanO on the output of LoRSanitO.
Brzuska et al. did not explicitly state if such recovery can be done publicly or requires a secret key. Indeed, in all existing constructions of unlinkable sanitizable signatures [7] , the recovery mechanism is public, which violates invisibility. Therefore, to achieve unlinkability and invisibility simultaneously, we must explicitly state that the admissible modifications can be recovered from a valid signature (hopefully only) with the corresponding sanitizer secret key. We say that a sanitizable signature scheme has privately extractable admissible modifications, if there exists a PPT algorithm ExtAdm which performs the following:
Fig. 2: Oracles for Sanitizable Signatures
The admissible modifications extraction algorithm inputs a signer public key pk S , a sanitizer secret key sk Z , and a signature. It outputs a description α of the admissible modifications.
In what follows, we only consider sanitizable signature schemes which have privately extractable admissible modifications.
Security of Sanitizable Signatures
We require a sanitizable signature scheme to be immutable, strongly accountable, strongly invisible, strongly proof-restrictedly transparent, and unlinkable. Different variations of these properties were defined in the literature [6, 7, 28, 3] . We will recall the definitions below for completeness. Additionally, we define the notions of weak immutability and weak unlinkability, which are achieved by our first construction. Our second construction then upgrades these properties to their regular counterparts.
We remark that (strong) unforgeability and privacy were considered in the literature. It is known that (strong) signer accountability and (strong) sanitizer accountability together imply (strong) unforgeability, while (strong) proof-restricted transparency implies proofrestricted privacy [6, 28] . Unlinkability is also shown to imply privacy [7] . We therefore do not consider unforgeability and privacy explicitly.
Immutability. Immutability requires that a malicious sanitizer cannot change inadmissible blocks. That is, an adversary should not be able to produce a forgery (pk * Z , m * , σ * ), such that m * cannot be produced by any admissible modifications delegated to pk * Z . Note that the set of admissible modifications of a signature is bound to (the public key of) the sanitizer to which the signature is issued. We also consider a relaxed notion called weak immutability, where a forgery is not considered valid if m * can be produced by a modification which is admissible for some (not necessarily pk * Z ) sanitizers. Definition 7 (Immutability [6] ). A sanitizable signature scheme Π is said to be immutable if for all PPT adversaries A, the probability that the experiment Pr ExpImmutability A,Π (1 Figure 3 . Additionally, we say that Π is weakly immutable if, in the experiment wExpImmutability A,Π (1 λ ), the condition pk * Z = pk Z,i in the dashed box is dropped.
Strong Transparency. Transparency means that sanitized signatures look like nonsanitized signatures. Rigorously speaking, transparency cannot be achieved if one is given oracle access to a prove oracle, which distinguishes sanitized signatures from fresh signatures. A relaxed notion, known as proof-restricted transparency is thus considered, which requires that one cannot decide whether a signature is sanitized or fresh, without the help of the prove oracle.
Definition 8 (Strong (Proof-Restricted) Transparency [28] ). A sanitizable signature scheme Π is strongly proof-restrictedly transparent if for all PPT adversaries A,
where ExpTransparency Figure 3 . If
then we say Π is perfectly strongly proof-restrictedly transparent. Furthermore, if the step Q = Q (δ(m), σ ) in the Sign/SanO b oracle (highlighted in the dashed box) is dropped, so that Q remains empty throughout the experiment, then we simply say Π is perfectly strongly transparent.
Strong Accountability. This property demands that the origin of a (possibly sanitized) signature should be undeniable by the signer. Definition 9 (Strong Sanitizer-Accountability [28] ). A sanitizable signature scheme Π is strongly sanitizer-accountable if for all PPT adversaries A,
where ExpSanAcc A,Π (1 λ ) is defined in Figure 3 .
Definition 10 (Strong Signer-Accountability [28] ). A sanitizable signature scheme Π is strongly signer-accountable if for all PPT adversaries A,
where Figure 3 .
Invisibility. Invisibility requires that the admissible modifications of a signature are hidden from an external observer.
Definition 11 (Strong Invisibility [3]).
A sanitizable signature scheme Π is strongly invisible if for all PPT adversaries A,
where ExpInvisibility Figure 3 .
Unlinkability. Unlinkability means that one cannot decide the source of a given sanitized signature, unless it is revealed trivially by the message. The notion is modeled by considering an experiment where the adversary is given a "left-or-right sanitize" oracle LoRSanitO which, on input two signatures, sanitizes one of them and returns the resulting signature. We also consider a relaxed notion called weak unlinkability, where the adversary is only allowed to query LoRSanitO on honestly generated signatures.
Definition 12 (Weak Unlinkability). A sanitizable signature scheme SS is weakly unlinkable if for all PPT adversaries A,
where wExpUnlink Figure 3 .
Definition 13 (Unlinkability [6] ). A sanitizable signature scheme SS is unlinkable if for all PPT adversaries A,
where ExpUnlink Figure 3 .
Construction
We propose a two-step construction of sanitizable signatures with immutability, strong accountability, strong proof-restricted transparency, strong invisibility, and unlinkability. In the first step, using equivalence class signatures and other basic primitives, we construct a scheme with weak immutability, perfect strong transparency, strong invisibility, and weak unlinkability. This scheme does not achieve accountability. Next, we show how one can transform any schemes with these properties one with all desirable properties, using verifiable ring signatures.
Construction I: Achieving Unlinkability and Invisibility
Let > 1 be an integer. Let EQS be an equivalence class signature scheme, H : {0, 1} * → G 2 be a hash function (to be modeled as a random oracle), and PKE be a public-key encryption scheme. We present in Figure 4 a construction of sanitizable signatures Π 1 . The construction satisfies weak immutability, strong invisibility, perfect strong transparency, and weak unlinkability, but not accountability.
Informally, the signer issues signatures as follows. On input a message m = m 1 . . . m , the signer samples fresh BLS-like public and secret keys, which are used to sign the messages. Concretely, the i-th public key consists of a tuple
with Y i = X yi i for some y i ∈ Z q , and the secret key is y i . It then signs the vectors X = (X 1 , . . . , X ) andȲ = (Y 1 , . . . , Y ) using EQS. Next, in the same way as in [3] , it encrypts the BLS-like secret keys y i corresponding to the admissible message blocks using the PKE public key of the sanitizer. Finally, it outputs the signature which consists of two EQS signatures, BLS-like signatures and public keys, and a PKE ciphertext.
To sanitize, the sanitizer decrypts the PKE ciphertext and obtains the BLS-like secret keys corresponding to the admissible blocks, which are then used to sign the corresponding modified messages. Using the homomorphic property of the BLS-like scheme, the sanitizer can rerandomizeX andȲ toX r andȲ r·s respectively, and rerandomize the signatures accordingly so that they are compatible with the new public keys. Using the signature adaptation properties of EQS, it can also obtain fresh-looking EQS signatures onX r andȲ r·s respectively. Finally, the sanitizer re-encrypts the new BLS-like secret keys, and outputs the signature.
Since we do not aim to provide accountability, the prove algorithm always returns the empty string and the judge algorithm always outputs S. The correctness of Π 1 follows trivially from the correctness of the building blocks. Below, we state our main theorem and we defer its proof to Section 5.
If EQS is EUF-CMA-secure, then Π 1 is weakly immutable in the generic group and random oracle model. If PKE is IND-CCA-secure, then Π 1 is strongly invisible. If EQS perfectly adapts signatures, then Π 1 is perfectly strongly transparent (and hence also perfectly strongly proof-restrictedly transparent). If the equivalence relation R is class-hiding, EQS perfectly adapt signatures, and PKE is correct and is IND-CCA-secure, then Π 1 is weakly unlinkable in the generic group random oracle model.
Finally, we remark that it is trivial to extend the construction to the multi-sanitizer setting by encrypting the (possibly different subsets of) BLS-like keys for different sanitizers.
BG := (G1, G2, GT , G1, G2, GT , e, q) 
Construction II: Generic Transformation for Accountability
In this section, we show a generic transformation ( Figure 5 ), from any weakly immutable, non-accountable, strongly invisible, strongly proof-restricted transparent, and weakly unlinkable schemes Π 1 , to an immutable, strongly accountable, strongly invisible, strongly proof-restricted transparent, and unlinkable scheme Π 2 , using a verifiable ring signature scheme VRS. An overview of the transform follows. The signer signs the public key of the sanitizer and the message in σ SS using Π 1 , then signs σ SS in σ VRS using VRS, where the ring contains the public key of the signer and the public key of the sanitizer. The signer outputs the signature σ = (σ SS , σ VRS ). To sanitize, the sanitizer sanitizes σ SS using Π 1 to produce σ SS , then signs σ SS in σ VRS using VRS. The sanitized signature is σ = (σ SS , σ VRS ). To verify any signature σ = (σ SS , σ VRS ), the verifier uses the verification algorithm of Π 1 on σ SS and the verification algorithm of VRS on σ VRS . To prove that a signature σ = (σ SS , σ VRS ) is sanitized, the signer proves that he did not generate σ VRS using the prove algorithm of VRS, which gives accountability.
Next, we sketch why the other security properties are preserved. For conciseness, we omit the qualitative attributes such as strong and proof-restricted in the following discussion. First, since Π 1 is weakly immutable, the sanitizer is not able to forge the part σ SS of a sanitized signature for a non-admissible message nor changing the sanitizer public key (which is signed as a message of Π 1 ). This implies that the resulting scheme is immutable. Next, since Π 1 is transparent, one cannot guess whether a signature is sanitized or not from the part σ SS . On the other hand, since VRS is anonymous, one cannot guess whether the part σ VRS was created by the signer or by the sanitizer. Combining both properties, we conclude that one cannot guess whether the signature was sanitized or not, i.e., Π 2 is transparent. Thirdly, Π 1 is invisible, so the part σ SS hides all information about the possible modifications of the message. Moreover, The signature σ VRS contains no information about the modifiable parts of the message. This implies that Π 2 is invisible. Finally, Π 1 is unlinkable, so the first part σ SS of a sanitized signature hides any information about the original signature, and the second part σ VRS does not depend on the original signature, so our resulting scheme Π 2 is also unlinkable. Note that Π 1 is weakly unlinkable in the sense that it is no longer secure if the adversary is allowed to send fresh signatures to the oracle LoRSanitO. This does not impact the security of Π 2 , because σ SS is signed in σ VRS , so to produce a fresh signature (σ SS , σ VRS ), the adversary should be able to forge σ VRS , which is supposed to be hard under the hypothesis that the VRS scheme is unforgeable.
The correctness of Π 2 follows trivially from the correctness of Π 1 and VRS. Below, we state the formal security results for the construction. Due to space constraints, we refer to Appendix B for the formal security proofs.
Theorem 2.
If Π 1 is weakly immutable, then Π 2 is immutable. If Π 1 is weakly unlinkable, and VRS is strongly unforgeable, then Π 2 is unlinkable. If Π 1 is strongly invisible then Π 2 is strongly invisible. If VRS is strongly accountable, then Π 2 is strongly signer accountable. If VRS is strongly non-seizable, then Π 2 is strongly sanitizer accountable. If VRS is anonymous and Π 1 is strongly proof-restrictedly transparent, then Π 2 is strongly proof-restrictedly transparent.
We remark that verifiable ring signatures can be constructed generically from linkable ring signatures [30] , which in turn can be generically constructed from unique ring signatures [18] . It is also possible to use any stronger primitive such as traceable [22] or accountable [38] ring signatures, as long as the signers are accountable. Furthermore, the transform can be easily extended to a multi-sanitizer setting by signing with respect to a ring which consists of the signer and multiple sanitizers. Depending on the variant of ring signatures used, we obtain different flavors of accountability. As the implications are straightforward, we do not elaborate further.
Security Proof for Construction I
The following proof uses the generic group model abstraction of Shoup [?] and we refer the reader to [?] for a comprehensive introduction to the bilinear group model. Here we state the central lemma useful for proving facts about generic attackers.
Lemma 2 (Schwartz-Zippel). Let F (X 1 , . . . , X m ) be a non-zero polynomial of degree d ≥ 0 over a field F. Then the probability that F (x 1 , . . . , x m ) = 0 for randomly chosen values (x 1 , . . . , x m ) in F n is bounded from above by d |F| .
Weak Immutability
Proof (Weak Immutability). To prove that Π 1 is weakly immutable, we first show the generic hardness of the following problem.
with q > 2 λ , and a, b, c ← Z q . For all generic group adversary A, the probability that A on input
2 ) be the output of A. Since A is generic, it holds that
for some coefficients u 1 , u a , u b , v 1 , v a , v b , x 1 , x a , x b , y 1 , y a , y b , z 1 , z 
AB is a quadratic polynomial in the variables A and B. Suppose f is not a zero polynomial, by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma (Lemma 2), for a, b ← Z q , the probability that f (a, b) = 0 is upper bounded by 2/q < 2 1−λ which is negligible. Therefore we can assume that f is always zero. In particular, we have x 1 = x b = 0. Similarly, by examining the relation bv − y = 0, we can assume that v 1 = y b , and y 1 = y a = 0. We can therefore write x = x a a and y = y b b. Next, we examine the relation cy − xz = 0, which implies
Using the Schwartz-Zippel lemma again, we can assume that y b = 0. However, this means that v = v 1 = y b = 0, which contradicts with the fourth relation v = 0. Now, suppose there exists a generic group adversary A against the weak immutability of Π 1 . We construct a generic group adversary C which solves the problem defined in Lemma 3. C receives as challenge 
2 was received as a challenge as described above. If (k l , m l ) was a message that was queried previously, then reply with the same response as before.
Answering Sign Oracle Queries Upon receiving (pk Z,, m i , α i ) as the i-th query to the SignO oracle, if i = i † and i = j † , C answers the query honestly by running the procedures as defined in the SignO oracle.
In the case i = i † or i = j † , C generates the signature honestly except for the following changes:
which it had received from its challenger in the beginning. For all other k ∈ [ ]\{k † }, C generates the X k honestly by picking
(as done in the SignO oracle). The rest of the signature is generated as in the SignO oracle. 
Suppose
and the rest of the signature honestly as done in the SignO oracle. Note that as we assume k † / ∈ α j † in this case, the value y j † ,k † is not needed to generate the signature. Therefore the signature can be simulated faithfully.
Answering Prove Oracle Queries. The Prove oracle is trivially simulatable since the Prove algorithm always returns .
Clearly, assuming that C did not abort, C simulates the wExpImmutability experiment for A faithfully. Eventually, A outputs (pk * Z , m * , σ * ) as a forgery such that Verify(pk † S , pk * Z , m * , σ * ) = 1, and m * k = m i,k for some i, k such that k / ∈ α i . Since Q 1 , ∈ poly (λ), with non-negligible probability it holds that m *
, with non-negligible probability it holds
If that is the case, then the abort conditions in the above procedures of answering sign oracle queries are never triggered.
Parse Since Q 1 ∈ poly (λ), it happens with non-negligible probability that 
. By a routine calculation, one can verify that au−x = 0, bv−y = 0, cy−xz = 0 and v = 0. Since A only performs generic group operations, so does C, which contradicts with Lemma 3.
Strong Invisibility
Proof (Strong Invisibility). We prove strong invisibility by hybrid argument. We define an intermediate experiment is computationally indistinguishable to ExpInvisibility
Before proving the claim above, we state two key observations. First, note that the signatures returned by the LoRAdmO b oracle in the all experiments are identically distributed if pk Z = pk † Z (since now it must hold that α 0 = α 1 for the oracle to not abort). In the case pk Z = pk † Z , the signatures returned by the oracle are almost identically distributed, except for the ciphertext c. In particular, in the experiment ExpInvisibility The second observation is that, due to the restriction imposed on the SanO oracle, the values x i for all i ∈ (α b − (α 0 • α 1 )) are never used in any experiments.
With the above observations, we show how one can construct an algorithm C, which breaks the IND-CCA-security of PKE, using a distinguisher which distinguishes Hyb Upon receiving a query (pk S , m, δ, σ) to the SanO oracle, C parses σ as
, c) and checks if c = c j for some j. If so, it uses {y j,i } i∈αj,0∩αj,1 to answer the oracle query. If not, it queries the DecO oracle provided by the IND-CCA challenger on c, receives τ = (α, {ζ i } i∈ ), and uses it to answer the oracle query.
Clearly, depending on the choice of the IND-CCA challenger, our adversary simulates either the experiment ExpsInvis b Π,A (1 λ ) or Hyb b faithfully. Therefore, if there exists a distinguisher which distinguishes the two experiments with a certain probability, then our adversary can guess the choice of the IND-CCA challenger with the same probability.
Perfect Strong Transparency
Proof (Perfect Strong Transparency). We show that the construction is perfectly strongly transparent through hybrid argument. First, observe that the Prove algorithm, and hence also the ProveO oracle, always returns the empty string , it is safe to drop the step Q = Q (δ(m), σ ) in the Sign/SanO b oracle. Now, let Q = poly (λ) be the number of queries that the adversary A make to the Sign/SanO b oracle. We define the hybrids Hyb 0 , . . . , Hyb q as follows. The hybrid Hyb 0 is identical to ExpTrans ∈ α, then the oracle returns ⊥ in both experiments and thus the equality holds trivially. Otherwise, let m := δ(m), and let σ be the response. In Hyb j−1 , the signature σ is drawn from a distribution D where
Replacing x i and y i with r · x i and s · y i respectively for some r, s ← Z * q , we obtain a distribution D = D where , (Y 1 , . . . , Y ) ). Therefore, we obtain a distribution D = D with
Note that in Hyb j , the signature σ is drawn exactly from D . Therefore we can conclude that Hyb j−1 and Hyb j are functionally equivalent.
Weak Unlinkability
Proof (Weak Unlinkability). To show that the experiments wExpUnlink 
whereas for the LHS the equation is identical except that all occurrences of w i and w j are replaced with y i · s and y j · s, respectively. Since all variables are uniformly distributed, by Lemma 2 we have that the coefficient of each unique monomial must be 0 with all but negligible probability. It is left to argue that each non-trivial relation obtained on the RHS imply also a corresponding non-trivial relation on the LHS, and viceversa. By inspection we isolate the pairs
that have potentially common monomials. For the latter case it is enough to observe that the monomials are identical for both the LHS and the RHS distributions as they are independent of w i and s for all i ∈ [ ]. Therefore if
in the RHS then so it does in the LHS, and vice versa. For the former case we have that collisions occur only when i = j and b = 1, as otherwise the monomials are distinct and therefore any non trivial set of coefficients will not cancel out (with very high probability). Setting i = j and b = 1, for the RHS we have the following constraint
which implies that, with overwhelming probability, for all i ∈ [ ] it holds that e 1 i,i = −g i,i . Applying this constraint to the LHS we obtain a corresponding non-trivial relation
The reverse direction holds with an identical argument. Since there is a bijection between the non-trivial relations on the LHS and those on the RHS, we can conclude that the view of A in the two cases are indistinguishable. Security of a public key encryption scheme is formalized as follows.
Definition 15 (CCA Security).
A PKE scheme is said to have indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) if for all PPT adversaries A,
where ExpCCA b A,PKE is defined in Figure 6 .
A.2 Properties of Verifiable Ring Signatures
We define slightly simplified and strengthened security definitions for VRS. We note that the existing construction in [9] satisfies all properties defined below.
Unforgeability. A VRS is unforgeable when no adversary that has access to the signature oracle and the proof oracle is able to forge a fresh message-signature pair (m, σ), such that the corresponding ring contains public keys of honest users only. In the following definition, the oracle VRS.SignO defined as in Def. 17 and Q is the set of message-signature pairs associated to the queries to the oracle VRS.SignO. Additionally, the adversary has access to the proof oracle VRS.ProveO that takes as input a tuple (L, m, σ, ), returns VRS.Prove(L, m, σ, pk , sk ) if 1 ≤ ≤ n and ⊥ otherwise.
Definition 16 (Unforgeability).
A VRS scheme VRS is strongly unforgeable if for all n ∈ poly(λ) and for all PPT adversary A,
where ExpUnf n VRS,A (1 λ ) is defined in Figure 8 .
Fig. 7: Oracles for Verifiable Ring Signatures
Anonymity. A VRS is anonymous when no adversary is able to link a signature to the public key of its signer. In the formal definition, the adversary has access to the oracles defined in Figure 7 .
Definition 17 (Anonymity). A VRS scheme VRS is anonymous if for all PPT
where ExpAnon Figure 8 .
Strong Accountability. A VRS is strongly accountable when no adversary that has access to the signature oracle and the proof oracle is able to forge a fresh message-signature pair (m, σ) together with a proof that it is not the signer of σ, such that the corresponding ring contains at most one public key of a non-honest user. In the following definition, the oracle VRS.SignO defined as in Def. 17 and Q is the set of message-signature pairs associated to the queries to the oracle VRS.SignO. Additionally, the adversary has access to the proof oracle VRS.ProveO that takes as input a tuple (L, m, σ, ), returns VRS.Prove(L, m, σ, pk , sk ) if 1 ≤ ≤ n and ⊥ otherwise.
Definition 18 (Strong Accountability).
A VRS scheme VRS is strongly accountable if for all n ∈ poly(λ) and for all PPT adversary A,
where ExpAcc n VRS,A (1 λ ) is defined in Figure 8 .
It follows immediately that strong accountability implies strong unforgeability.
Strong Non-Seizability. A VRS is strongly non-seizable when no adversary that has access to the signature and the proof oracle is able to forge a fresh message-signature pair (m, σ), such that the proof algorithm ran by the honest user returns a proof that σ was computed by the honest user. In the following definition, the oracles SignO and ProveO and the list Q are defined as in Def. 18. We therefore conclude that ExpImmutability B,Π1 (1 λ ) = 1. To summarize, if ExpImmutability A,Π2 (1 λ ) returns 1 with non-negligible probability, then wExpImmutability B,Π1 (1 λ ) also returns 1 with non-negligible probability, which contradicts that Π 1 is weakly immutable.
B.2 Unlinkability
Proof (Unlinkability). We define the following sequence of hybrid experiments: Hyb Proof. Suppose that there exists a polynomial time adversary A that forces the challenger to abort in Hyb b 1 with non negligible probability, we show how to build a polynomial time adversary B that breaks the unforgeability of the VRS scheme with non-negligible probability. B receives the set of public keys {vpk At the end of the experiment, B returns b . Clearly, the experiment is perfectly simulated for A, so ExpInvisibility (1 λ ) returns 1, which is a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
B.4 Strong Accountability
Proof (Strong Signer accountability). Assume that there exists a polynomial time adversary A that breaks the strong signer accountability of Π 2 . We show how to build an algorithm B that breaks the strong accountability of VRS for n = 1. (1 λ ) output 1 differ by the same non-negligible probability, which contracts the assumption that VRS is anonymous.
Next, we argue that for any PPT adversary A, the probabilities that the experiments ExpHTransparency A,Π2 (1 λ ) and ExpTransparency (1 λ ) output 1 differ by the same non-negligible probability, which contracts the assumption that Π 1 is strongly proof-restricted transparent.
